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Protecting the Ignorant, the Unthinking and the Credulous: Are the FDA's Eorts to Accelerate the Drug Approval Process Compromising Public Safety?
Recently, ve approved prescription drugs were recalled in a one-year period
after the Food and Drug Administration (FDA or the agency) deemed them
to be too unsafe for patient use.1 Notorious among them was fenuramine
(Pondimin), the \fen" half of \fen-phen," a drug used to promote weight loss in
patients. The list also includes Seldane, a popular antihistamine as well as Re-
dux, Posicor, and the pain medication Duract.2 All had side eects not detected
in clinical trials. This unusually high rate of withdrawals in such a short period
of time sparked the most recent round of debate over the ever-controversial topic
of the FDA drug approval process.
For decades the FDA has been criticized for its lengthy approval process.3 Pa-
tients have demanded faster access to drug treatments and medical products.
Recently, however, the debate has shifted to the other extreme. Patients are
demanding safer drugs, claiming that the agency is allowing drugs to go to the
market before they are proven to be safe and eective.4 The FDA, the govern-
1See Tamar Nordenberg, When is a Medical Product Too Risky? FDA Consumer Maga-
zine, September { October 1999; See also John Schwartz, Is FDA too Quick to Clear Drugs?
Growing Recalls, Side-Eect Risks Raise Questions, The Washington Post, March 23, 1999.
2See Nordenberg, supra note 1.
3See Peter Barton Hutt & Richard A. Merrill, Food and Drug Law: Cases and
Materials, Second Edition, at 580-83 (Critics coined the term \drug lag" to describe the
lengthy, and what many consider unnecessary, FDA review process).
4See Report to the FDA Commissioner from the Task force on Risk Management, Man-
1ment's guardian of public health and safety, must balance two compelling, yet
contradicting ideals. The agency must get drugs out to the public as fast as
possible but keep drugs in clinical trials long enough to prove them safe.
The high rate of drug withdrawals in 1999 has brought the debate full circle
from 1987, the peak of the AIDS crisis. Then, patients were literally climbing
the walls of FDA oces and staging protests across the nation demanding access
to drugs as early as possible.5 The FDA sped up the approval of AIDS related
drugs through legislation that allowed accelerated approval for \investigative
new drugs" (INDs).6 Since that time the agency has put many more regula-
tions in place that speed up almost every aspect of the approval process. Now,
with the recall arm of the FDA working overtime, patients are demanding that
the agency slow down and set in place more regulation to insure greater safety.
Despite the current attitude that the agency has compromised its standards
in the rush to approve untested drugs, the current process of drug approval
that allows new drugs to get to the market faster strikes the proper balance
between the individual patient's right of access and the overall protection of
human health and safety.
aging the Risks From Medical Product Use: Creating a Risk Management Framework, U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, Food and Drug Administration, May 1999, at 17.
(The report notes specically that the Public Citizen's Health Research Group expressed con-
cerns that the agency was compromising its safety standards for shorter review times. Public
Citizen conducted a survey of FDA reviewers and determined that 19 out of 53 reviewers had
at least one recommendation of disapproval denied by the agency. This statistic, not very
telling without more information, nonetheless caused tremendous concern for Public Citizen);
see also Rochelle Sharpe, FDA Tries to Find the Right Balance on Drug Approvals, The
Wall Street Journal, April 20, 1999.
5See Remarks by David Kessler, IOM 25th Anniversary Lecture, Seattle, Washington,
November 7, 1994, <http://www.fda.gov/oashi/aids/iomkes.html>; see also Larry Thompson,
Experimental Treatments? Unapproved But Not Always Unavailable, FDA Consumer Mag-
azine, January-February 2000 (1000 gay activists staged a protest outside of the agency's
headquarters in Rockville, Maryland, trapping the agency's sta inside).
6See infra part I.B.
2I. A Historical Perspective on Accelerated Ap-
proval Mechanisms
A. Pre-1987
The rst cornerstone of today's drug legislation was laid in 1938 following
the tragedy of Elixir of Sulfanilamide, a calamity that moved Congress to pass
the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).7 Almost 100 people were poisoned
by the elixir, which reached the market without any testing for toxicity.8 The
legislation required that companies test their products for safety before releas-
ing them to the public. In 1962 yet another tragedy struck. After thalidomide,
a morning sickness alleviator, caused more than 1,000 birth defects in Europe,9
Congress added the second fundamental consumer protection legislation to the
FDA pre-market approval process.10 Now companies would be required to show
that their products were both safe and eective in treating what they were mar-
keted to cure. Eectiveness had to be proven through the use of controlled tri-
als.11 The adequacy of the trials was determined according to specic scientic
standards for evidence.
7Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codied as
amended in 21 U.S.C. ^ ^ 301-92 (1994)).
8See Richard J. Nelson, Regulation of Investigational New Drugs: `Giant Step For the
Sick and Dying'? 77 Geo. L.J. 463, 468-69, (1988); See also Lois K. Perrin, The Catch-22
for Persons with AIDS: To Have or Not to Have Easy Access to Experimental Therapies
and Early Approval for New Drugs, 69 S. Cal. L. Rev. 105, 110 (1995); See also Myron L.
Marlin, Treatment INDs: A Faster Route to Drug Approval? 39 Am. U. L. Rev. 171, 176
(1989).
9See Id.
10Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962) (codied in scattered
sections of 21 U.S.C. ^ ^ 301-81 (1994)).
11See Hutt & Merrill, supra note 3, at 514-16, for a detailed discussion of the three phases
of a drug investigation. (citing the Report of the Subcommittee on Science, Research and
Technology of the House Committee on Science and Technology, 96th Congress, 2nd Session
(1980)).
3The 1962 Drug Amendments, whose mechanisms are largely in tact still today,12
calls for pre-market testing rst on animals. This initial phase lasts on average
about two years13 and must show evidence of low toxicity to advance to the
stage where human testing is allowed. The human testing, known as clinical
trials, encompasses three phases.14 Phase I involves use of the product in a
small number of healthy subjects to determine dosage and gather preliminary
data. Phase II begins the actual trials of the drug in subjects who have the
condition that the drug is intended to treat against. This stage involves a con-
trol group. Finally, Phase III involves several thousands of patients in a wide
spread investigation of the drug's eectiveness. The average time period for a
drug to move through these three phases is around 5 years, but the range en-
compasses two to ten years.15 Once the testing is complete, sponsor companies
may submit a \new drug application" (NDA) to the FDA and wait for a period
of one to two years while the agency administers the approval process.16 If the
NDA is approved, the drug can be prescribed to the public. Post-market use
(often called Phase IV) is, however, an important element of the investigation
and calls for a careful monitoring of the drug for safety and eectiveness.17 It
is in this stage that the FDA may withdraw its approval and pull a drug o the
market if it becomes clear that its use is unsafe or if safer alternatives develop.
Even as early as 1970 the agency recognized the need to decrease the time of
12See Nelson, supra note 8, at 470.
13See Ken Flieger, Testing Drugs in People, FDA Consumer Magazine, July-August 1994.
14See Id.; see also text accompanying note 11.
15See Flieger, supra note 13.
16See Id.; see also Nordenberg, supra note 1.
17See Steven R. Salbu, The FDA and Public Access to New Drugs: Appropriate Levels of
Scrutiny in the Wake of HIV, AIDS, and the New Diet Drug Debcle, 79 B.U. L. Rev. 93, 112
(1999).
4the drug approval process for critically ill patients with little or no alternative
treatments. In 1977 the FDA introduced a predecessor to today's treatment
IND, known as \compassionate IND" which allowed physicians to prescribe an
experimental drug to a patient even if the primary purpose was not investiga-
tion, but actual treatment.18 Use of compassionate INDS was informal, ad hoc
and not widely publicized.19
B. AIDS and Treatment INDs
The drug approval process has been widely criticized for its length since its in-
ception in 1962.20 However, never had the agency been so moved to action by
its critics until the early 1980s when, in the words of recent FDA commissioner
David Kessler, \AIDs activists were literally scaling the walls of the FDA build-
ing in Rockport, Maryland demanding access to potential therapies that had
barely moved out of the test tube."21 These were desperate patients with no
alternatives who felt that the agency's policies were denying them of their choice
to take the risk of unknown treatments over the near certainty of death. In 1987
the FDA responded to AIDS patients' demands to rush new medication through
the approval process.22 Congress passed legislation to allow for investigational
18See Ken Flieger, FDA Finds New Ways to Speed Treatments to Patients, FDA Consumer
Magazine, October 1993; see also Nelson, supra note 8, at 471.
19See Id.
20See Hutt & Merrill, supra note 3, at 581 (quoting Sam Peltzman, Testifying before the
Subcommittee on Monopoly of the Senate Small Business Committee, 93rd Congress, 1st
Session (1973)).
21Kessler, supra note 5.
22See How the AIDS Crisis Made Drug Regulators Speed Up, New York Times, Sept. 24,
1989, p.E5.
5new drugs, known as \IND"s, to have an accelerated clinical trial period.23
The FDA did, however, impose restrictions on treatment INDs. While the ini-
tiative makes drugs available in the Phase 2 stage, it applies to drugs intended
only for the treatment of \immediately life threatening" and \serious" diseases,
for which no satisfactory therapy is available at that stage of the disease.24 In
addition, the agency imposes restrictions on the sponsor company. The sponsor
must exercise due diligence in completing the clinical trials and investigation of
the new drug.25 In addition, the sponsor may charge for the drug to recover
costs, but it may not commercialize its product.26 This legislation marked the
rst formal procedure that allowed patients to decide for themselves whether
they would rather bear the risk of unproven treatment or struggle with an un-
treatable disease.
C. More Recent Acceleration Mechanisms
Since the 1987 treatment IND program, the agency has instituted more poli-
cies designed to speed up many aspects of the drug approval process. While
the treatment IND program made drugs available to a certain class of people
sooner, the fast track program expedited widespread approval.27 The fast track
approach allows drugs to enter the market after two, rather than three, phases
of testing. This would usually mean that two or three years would be cut o
2321 C.F.R. ^  312.34(b)(1)(i)-(iv) (1988), (promulgating new regulations that allow greater
access to promising new drugs not yet available on the market).
24See Id.
25See Id.
26See Flieger, supra note 18.
2721 C.F.R. ^ ^ 312.80-312.82 (1988)
6the standard approval time for the product.28 In 1992 the FDA instituted the
parallel track program that oers patients who cannot participate in a clinical
trial either for geographic reasons or for lacking entry criteria to receive the
same promising therapies from their physicians.29
That same year the FDA initiated the Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA).30
This program enabled sponsors to pay fees to the agency in exchange for priority
review. The fees allowed the FDA to obtain more resources and sta, which
greatly increased the agency's ability to process NDAs faster. The PDUFA pro-
gram was instituted for a ve-year trial period but it was so successful that the
FDA reauthorized PDUFA in the FDA Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA).31
The Modernization Act also formalized approval based on surrogate marker
data.32 This program allows for drug eectiveness to be proved from sources
not traditionally relied on. While the sources of evidence may vary from tradi-
tional clinical studies, the FDA claims that its standards of eectiveness have
not changed.
II. Right to Access versus Right to Answers
A. The Necessity of Patient Choice.
28See Salbu, supra note 17, at 114.
29Expanded Availability of Investigational New Drugs Through Parallel Track Mechanism
for People with AIDS and Other HIV-Related Disease, 57 Fed. Reg., 13,250, 13,250 (1992).
30Prescription Drug User Fee Act, Pub. L. No. 102-571, ^ 101, 106 Stat. 4491 (1992).
31Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 105-115, ^ 101, 111 Stat. 2296, 2296-2305
32New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biological Drug Product Regulations; Accelerated Approval,
57 Fed. Reg. 58,942, 58,942 (1992) (For example, if a new product claims that it reduces
the likelihood of death, then the meaningful endpoint of an investigation into that drug is
death of the subjects. However, the FDA allows a surrogate endpoint, such as a decrease in
a symptom of the disease, to substitute for the intended endpoint).
7The Supreme Court has upheld the FDA's right to withhold experimental
drugs from patients in United States v. Rutherford.33 The Court held that the
agency has the authority to require a showing of safety and eectiveness in every
drug, including those used to treat the terminally ill. The Court concluded that
Congress intended to shield even those patients from fraudulent products. This
case established that the agency may constitutionally prevent patients from
having a choice in their drug therapy.
Since the AIDS crisis in the eighties, the FDA's eorts to increase accelerated
approval mechanisms have been driven by the philosophy that patients deserve
more of a say in their treatment, and thus warrant greater access to experimental
drugs.34 The paternalism of the eighties seems to have given way to a regime
in which patients are freer to judge for themselves the marginal benets of
unknown therapies. But now, in light of the recent withdrawals, people are
concerned that patient access is too excessive. Even seriously ill patients should
not have access to truly unsafe drugs. Deciphering this dilemma requires the
determination of whether or not a patient can make a rational choice based on
very little information. The government may provide physicians with all known
information and possible risks, but it may not be enough to insure that the
patient understands the choice in front of her. Despite these concerns, however,
33442 U.S. 544 (1979). (This case arose when a group of terminally ill cancer patients
led a class action siot to enjoin the government from prohibiting the movement in interstate
commerce of Laetrile, a cancer drug not approved by the FDA. Although the plaintis raised
both the modication and privacy issues, the Court left the privacy issue aside, and held that
the FDA regulations were to be applied without exception even to terminally ill patients).
34See Thompson, supra note 5. (\Over the last decade, FDA's institutional philosophy has
evolved to be more supportive of risk-taking by patients who have run out of options.").
8current accelerated approval mechanisms strike an appropriate balance between
these two dicult options.
One example of criticism has focused on the drug Viagra, prescription medicine
that combats male impotence. The drug took just six months for its NDA to
be approved.35 Soon after the drug became available to the public, evidence
trickled in to the FDA that the drug might be associated with heart attacks and
high blood pressure.36 However, patients continuously choose to use the drug
despite warnings about the risks involved. Doctors are nding that men lie about
their heart conditions and about other medications they are currently taking in
order to obtain a prescription for Viagra.37 A similar story surrounds the acne
medicine known as Accutane. Accutane is a wonder drug for those who feel
debilitated by their bad skin. However, it is also a powerful teratogen, causing
horrible birth defects if taken by pregnant women.38 The FDA found that,
despite explicit package warnings,39 patients still chose to take the medication
even at the risk of such harm. Even though critics feel that the patients' choices
are not rational, the FDA has taken the correct position in allowing patients
access to this kind of treatment. Protestors argue that impotence and acne are
not terrible enough problems to warrant the risks associated with these drugs.
35See Shanon Brownlee, Dying for Sex: The FDA approved Viagra Quickly { Perhaps Too
Quickly, US News and World Report, January 11, 1999.
36See Id.
37See Id. (\Georgia Medical College's Dr. Lewis says he prescribed Viagra to a man who
swore up and down that he wasn't on nitrates. Then, in a chance meeting with the man's
regular physician, Lewis learned that the man was in fact on the drugs. `You can't imagine
the patients who are asking for Viagra...they have multiple heart attacks. I have warned
patients time and again, and nevertheless they get Viagra."').
38See Hutt & Merrill, supra note 3, at 436.
39Every single pill has a picture of a pregnant woman encircled with a slash. In addition,
the packaging contains pictures of deformed babies and has printing in bold \NOT TO BE
TAKEN IF YOU ARE PREGNANT."
9However, patients, not the government, are the only ones who can decide if the
benets of treating their conditions are worth the known or possible risks.40
The IND program also comes under frequent attack for providing too much
patient access in the pre-approval stage. However, within the IND regime,
drugs are available only to treat patients with \serious" or life-threatening"
illnesses.41 Drugs may come under consideration only if there are few or no
alternatives available. Patients with this category of illness must play a very
active role in their health care, especially if they have a disease that requires
them to see dierent physicians, keep track of their medications, and monitor
their own development.42 Patient choice and access is especially critical in
a pressing disease, since only the individual herself can elect how much she
is willing to sacrice in return for only small possibilities of benet. More
importantly, access is limited to drugs that have a reasonable chance of being
successful in the marketplace. Because a company must pursue a clinical trial
investigation with \due diligence" it will not release a drug under IND status
unless it intends to market it eventually.43 Competition, nancial resources,
and projected demand for a drug will inuence its distribution and labeling as
an IND.44
40See Sheila Anne Feeney, The Battle with Acne, New York Daily News, January, 10,
2000. (The article interviews one patient who testies that her life with acne as a teenager
contributed to her current alcoholism. The article also quotes a statistic that people with
acne are twice as likely to be unemployed as those with normal skin. Many of these patients
feel that a drug that could eliminate their acne may well be worth the risk of harm).
41See supra part I.B.
42See Nordenberg, supra note 1.
43See Perrin, supra note 8, at 140-41.
44See Id.
10B. Structural Limitations on Patient Access
The concern about widespread patient access is disproportionate to the ac-
tual access available to patients. In fact, the drug pre-approval stage has struc-
tural limitations built into the system that serve to protect patients in the
absence of approval. For one thing, the FDA cannot give out the name of drugs
in experimental trials.45 Only in consult with a physician may a patient obtain
information about experimental treatment. Therefore, patients must have met
with a professional doctor, a step that brings them much closer to making a
truly informed decision.
Patients cannot receive an experimental drug from the FDA alone. The re-
sponsibility, as well as the desire, to participate in these accelerated approval
programs rests solely in the hands of the sponsor company.46 The FDA can-
not force a company to distribute its products, even at the patient's request.
Patients must petition the sponsor directly for access to the experimental treat-
ment. Companies weigh many factors in deciding whether or not to distribute
drugs to qualifying participants in the programs, and may choose to withhold
a drug that it feels does not show enough promise, or if there is not sucient
information on dosage. Since all use of the product must be reported to the
FDA even outside of the structured clinical investigation, if the patients has
45See Thompson, supra note 5.
46See Id.; see also Statement by Michael A. Friedman, M.D., Lead Deputy Commissioner
of the Food and Drug Administration, Department of Health and Human Services, before the
Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, United States House of Representatives,
April 22, 1998, <http://www.fda.gov/ola/1998/therapy.htm>.
11qualications that may skew the data and delay approval for more general use,
the company may wish to decline distribution of an experimental drug, even at
the patient's request with informed consent.
Finally, the FDA does not advise patients.47 The agency does not inuence
patients one way or the other in deciding on treatment. This neutrality is
important for the patient to make her own choice in weighing the risks against
the benets.
III. Faster Approval Times Do Not Mean Lower
Drug Safety
The story of INDs and other acceleration methods has been one of true
success. Over the past ve years, pharmaceutical rms have been able to in-
troduce 172 new medical products into the market, a substantial increase over
prior decades.48 Since PDUFA in 1992, the average number of new products
approved per year has increased by 40%, and in 1998 alone 75% of worldwide
molecular entities were rst launched in the United States.49 In prior decades
Americans complained of the \drug lag," the idea that drugs were available
much earlier abroad.50 However, today's environment is such that drugs are
47See Thompson, supra note 5.
48See Statement by Jane E. Henney, M.D., Commissioner of Food and Drugs, Food and Drug
Administration, before the Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, United
States Senate, October 21, 1999, <http://www.fda.gov/ola/modernization.html>.
49See Id.; see also Risk Management Report, supra note 4, at 17.
50See Perrin, supra note 7, at 115-16. (Actually, the term \drug lag" has been used in two
dierent contexts. The rst context describes the time dierence between approval abroad and
12now being reviewed in the United States as fast or faster than anywhere else in
the world.51 Nevertheless, the FDA faces a justiably ckle public. For decades
patients have demanded greater choice and access, and now, when the FDA can
prove success at meeting the public demand, patients insist they deserve more
insurance of drug safety. In response to recent concerns, the agency issued a
report studying the drug approval process and reexamining whether the new
procedures do enough to protect public health and safety.52
The FDA's Risk Management Report, published in May 1999, showed that the
current withdrawal rate in the United States is actually lower than it has been
for the past few decades.53 The drug approval process is proving more eective
in weeding out unsafe drugs. The rate was about 3% in the 1980s, lower in
the 90s and only slightly greater than 1% today.54 So, while new mechanisms
provide for faster approvals, the drugs that are eventually approved are proving
to be safer than those of a decade ago.
The report shows that while the NDA review process is halved, the overall
length of clinical trials has not decreased.55 In fact, the trial period is increas-
ingly expanding with greater scientic knowledge.56 The trial period is also
lengthened, as the FDA has increasingly required more studies of dierent pop-
approval in the United States, but the second usage describes the time between the completion
of the clinical trials and FDA approval. Critics claim that the agency creates a \drug lag"
with its lengthy review process. See text accompanying note 3; see also Risk Management
Report, supra note 4 at 16).
51See Statement of Janet E. Henney, supra note 48; see also Statement by David Kessler,
M.D., Commissioner, Food and Drug Administration, Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices, before the Committee on Labor and Human Resources, United States senate, February
21, 1996, <http://www.fda.gov/ola/1996/nktest.html>.
52See Risk Management Report, supra note 4.
53See Id. at 34-35.
54See Id. at 34.
55See Id. at 17.
56See Nordenberg, supra note 1.
13ulations, women, minorities, elderly, and so forth. Companies are also using
that time period to study the marketing eects of the drugs.57 This lengthened
clinical trial allows for a fuller safety database for the drug.
The criticism aimed specically at the IND process is additionally unwarranted.
Criticism of IND practice centers on the practical reality of the program. Some
critics claim that accelerated approval of a drug will discourage the completion
of clinical trials and the investigation of the drug's safety.58 While the regula-
tion requires that the trials be completed post-approval, the ability of patients
to procure experimental drugs without participating in a clinical trial will delay
the investigation and completion of safety testing. Protesters emphasize that
there is no standard denition of what denes \due diligence" and companies
may not direct as many resources to investigate a drug already approved un-
der the treatment IND program. However, very often IND status is granted
only when approval is imminent.59 In fact, those who support the program fre-
quently fault the FDA for waiting until much after Phase II has been completed
to grant IND status.60 Typically, drugs allowed under treatment IND status
have already shown promise and proven safety.61 Since the nal treatment IND
rule was published more than a decade ago, FDA has made more than 40 drug or
biological investigational products available to patients early and has approved
36 of them.62
57See Id.
58See Nelson, supra note 8 at 484.
59See Perrin, supra note 8, at 141.
60See Id.
61See Thompson, supra note 5.
62See Id.
14The agency attributes a lot of this success to PDUFA.63 As the FDA is
provided with more resources it can speed up the administrative aspect of the
approval process. More importantly, the agency attributes the success of ac-
celeration to greater cooperation between the FDA and sponsor companies. In
conducting clinical trials, companies will often fashion their investigations in a
manner in which the FDA is not likely to consider proper evidence of the drug's
eectiveness. Early correspondence between the agency and the companies has
led to a faster trial and review process. In fact, if the FDA had more resources
and sta that could spend more time with each sponsor, it could speed up every
drug approval process.64
IV. Longer Clinical Trials Will Not Result in Safer
Drugs
A. Clinical Trials Do Not Mirror Real World Use of the
Drug
A major aw in the critics call for slowing down the approval process by
expanding the scope or length of the clinical trial period is the misconception
that longer clinical trials mean safer drugs. Congress places great emphasis on
carrying out clinical trials:
There is general agreement among all interested groups that maintaining the
ability to carry out adequate and well-controlled trials expeditiously is essential
because without such trials it is not possible to determine whether the drug is
safe and eective. If the evidence for such a determination is never developed,
63See Nordenberg, supra note 1; see also Statement of Janet Henney, supra note 48.
64See Id.
15or it is not developed expeditiously, individuals with the disease for which the
drug is intended may suer needlessly.65
Unfortunately, while clinical trials are the most scientic way by which to
prove drug safety and eectiveness, expanding the trial length or even using
resources to insure that IND trials are completed would probably not unearth
the risks that the critics are most concerned about.
Clinical trials test for both safety and eectiveness in a very small population
of subjects.66 Trials are kept small in order to minimize the number of people
exposed to possible unknown risks. In addition, the trials require that the
subjects have certain entry criteria that enable the researchers to factor for
certain variables and to keep the \control" aspect of the tests. The goal of
minimizing exposure makes it a good idea to keep the trials small. The goal
of controlling the investigation through entry criteria makes it impossible to
expand the population of subjects. It simply is too dicult to nd many subjects
that meet the criteria. In fact, it could take decades or centuries to nd a larger
group. Thus, clinical trials can only test for risks that have an extremely high
chance of occurring.67 Risks that have a low or even medium chance of occurring
cannot be uncovered in a small population. That must wait until the product
is released to the public and tested on a large population.
6555 Fed. Reg. 20,802 { 03 (1990) (proposed May 21, 1990).
66See Risk Management Report, supra note 4, at 43 (The number of patients exposed to
the product increases 1000-fold or more when the new product moves to the marketplace.
Thus, if the trials include 1,500 patients, then the chances of seeing an adverse reaction that
occurs only once in 1500 uses (considered rare) go from 50-50 in the trial setting to greater
than 1000 cases in the public market.).
67See Nordenberg, supra note 1. (\For a risk, say, that would occur in 1 in 50,000 patients,
you would have to study 150,000 people before the drug was approved to give you a good
chance of that risk even showing up { although you still aren't guaranteed to nd it. To
study 150,000 people with each disease would be a prohibitive barrier to getting drugs on the
market.").
16Clinical trials alone could never uncover most risks associated with real-
world use of a drug, even if they were decades long. The FDA only requires
clinical testing for the intended use of the drug. Investigation of drug safety for
combination or \o-label" use is not a prerequisite for FDA approval.68 One of
the drugs pulled from the market in the recall debacle was fenuramine, a drug
used for years for short-term weight reduction. Only when physicians began
prescribing it in combination with other drugs did the lethal problems occur.
There is no feasible way for the FDA to test in combinations since there are
millions of permutations and sample patient populations are not big enough. It
would take centuries to procure subjects and run tests and no drug would ever
be released to the market. But while the FDA approves of drugs for intended
uses alone, most physicians prescribe drugs in combination with another ther-
apy or for other o-label uses. In fact, most drugs are used for purposes that
were not tested in FDA approval trials. 69 This \o label" use is so prevalent
and so important to our system that it cannot be eliminated. The FDA has no
authority to regulate the practice of medicine, and physicians may use legally
marketed drugs however their professional judgment dictates it may best serve
the patient.70 The FDA itself recognizes the value and necessity of o-label uses.
68As a matter of fact, until recently, the FDA had severe restrictions on advertising o-label
uses of drugs or disseminating even truthful information about non-approved uses. Patients
are now demanding permanent injunctions that bar the enforcement of these restrictions
on the ow of information about o-label uses of FDA approved drugs. See Washington
Legal Foundation New Release, January 4, 2000 (discussing the case of Washington Legal
Foundation v. Henney that will appear before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia on January 10, 2000).
69See Salbu, supra note 17, at 122; see also James M. Beck and Elizabeth D. Azari, FDA,
O-Label Use, and Informed Consent: Debunking Myths and Misconceptions, 53 Food &
Drug L.J. 71,
70See In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Products Liability Litigation, MDL No. 1014, 1996 WL
107556, at *3 (E.D.Pa. Mar. 8, 1996) (\The decision whether or not to use a drug for o-label
purposes is a matter of medical judgment, not of regulatory approval").
17A 1982 FDA Drug Bulletin stated that unlabeled uses of a drug are appropriate
and rational in certain circumstances and in fact may reect a therapy that is
well reported and approved of in the medical literature.71
One of the most signicant factors that dierentiate clinical trial use of a product
from real world use is that patients in experimental trial are closely monitored.
Clinical trial patients are seen by their physicians for reevaluation on a regu-
lar basis.72 The physicians monitor the patients' progress and perform regular
laboratory tests for early evidence of toxicity.73 Real world use of the product
could result in higher incidence and severer consequences of adverse reactions
simply because patients are not monitored closely or seen by their physicians
on a regular basis for early evidence of problems.
Lengthy review processes will not result in safer drugs. The consequences will
simply be less patient access to alternative therapies. Testing greater popu-
lations and in various combinations will result in costs so high that no drugs
would ever get to the market. Banning o-label use will result in a loss of
a myriad of benecial drug therapies. These are important mechanisms that
provide physicians and patients more options by which to ght diseases. Most
injuries and deaths associated with the use of medical products, in fact result
from known side eects.74 More than half of these injuries are avoidable using
the information physicians and patients already possess.75 Sadly, the risks asso-
7112 FDA Drug Bulletin 4-5 (1982) (cited in 59 Fed. Reg. 59,820, 59,821 (Nov. 18,
1994)).
72See Risk Management Report, supra note 4, at 46.
73See Id.
74See Id. at 8
75See Id. (citing Bates, D.W., L.L. Leape, and S. Petrycki, Incidence and Preventability of
Adverse Drug Events in Hospitalized Adults, J. Gen. Intern. Med., 8:289-294, (1993)).
18ciated with medicines on the market are never zero. A safe drug is one in which
the risks are reasonable, not eliminated. Expanded clinical trials cannot reduce
those risks. Risk reduction is most eective by means of the dissemination of
accurate information on managing those risks.
B. Testing on Women and Minorities
When there is a true need to slow the approval process in the interest of safety,
the FDA has been willing to do so. The FDA approval process has always
been lacking in its protection of women and minorities, and the accelerated
pace at which it proceeds only makes matters worse in this regard. The gender
gap is wider than most would anticipate, and extends well beyond reproductive
organs. For one thing, women have dierent saliva and digestive systems than
men, and may metabolize some medications dierently as well.76 Women make
more antibodies than men, are more prone to diseases like lupus, and suer
much more from migraine headaches and depression.77 Long thought to be
a male problem, heart disease has become a much more important issue for
women as studies show that just as many women die from heart attacks as men
do, although they get them about ten years later in life.78 One example of the
gender gap is Seldane, one of the ve drugs recently pulled from the market.
Doctors found that it caused heart arrhythmias in women twice as often than
it did in men.79 Since the FDA's decision to approve the drug depends on
76See Colleen Dunn, Medicine's Gender Gap Research on Women Picks Up Steam,
Chicago Tribune, January 12, 2000.
77See Id.
78See Id.
79See Id; see also Marlene Cimons, Genders respond Dierently to Drugs: Researchers
Trying to Solve Scientic Mystery, The Florida Times-Union, June 7, 1999; see also Lauren
19a cost/benet analysis of the known risks, women are at much greater risk
than men every time a drug gets approved on the basis of male subjects in
clinical trials. Therefore, in 1993, the agency passed legislation requiring that
clinical trials include the testing of women as well.80 Before 1993, drug testing
was conducted primarily on men. This new legislation slowed the clinical trial
period, raising the costs of investigation tremendously. However, despite the
fact that this is a reversal of the philosophy of patient access, the costs are
justied in light of the signicant dierences in adverse reactions between men
and women in many drugs.
Minority testing remains non-existent today. However, some population-
specic testing should be required when signicant dierences in adverse reac-
tions occur in various populations. Researchers have found, for example, that
asthma occurs in the African-American community 26% more than in Cau-
casians.81 70% more African-Americans suer from diabetes than do Cau-
casians.82Yet no legislation requires testing in this community. The cost of
testing all drugs on minority communities may be prohibitive to getting most
new drugs approved, but certainly drugs intended for use in treating asthma
and diabetes should be required to be tested on African-Americans prior to ap-
proval. If similar disparities exist in other communities as well, then the same
Neergaard, Drugs May be Prescribed by Sex, AP Online, May 15, 1999.
80See Executive Summary { Gender Studies in Product Development,
Policy Changes: The 1993 FDA Gender Guideline and NIH Initiatives,
<http://fda.gov/womens/gender/Exec4.htm>.
81See Closing the Gap, Multiethnic Healthcare: Asthma, <http://www.closing-the-
gap.com/Departments/Centers/asthma.html>.
82See Closing the Gap, Multiethnic Healthcare: Diabetes, <http://www.closing-the-
gap.com/Departments/Centers/diabetes.html>.
20rules should apply.
V. Conclusion
With regard to the drug approval process, the FDA faces an extremely vocal
opposition. As one critic put it, \the person who thought of accelerated approval
should be shot."83 However, the FDA's recent eorts at quickening the drug
approval process should be commended. The agency strikes a tting balance
between providing patients with access to alternative therapies while insuring
safety to the best of science's ability. The agency's current method of requiring
clinical trials is sucient in showing safety and eectiveness, without creating
a prohibitive barrier to the marketing of any drug. Recent withdrawal rates
remain fairly constant with previous decades, even as more drugs reach the
public faster than ever. Yet the FDA is not afraid to intervene in the interest
of safety, as is evident by its requirement of testing women in clinical trials.
Because the FDA holds such a powerful position in making new drugs available
to those who need them, the ability to delicately balance patient access against
patient safety is vital.
83See Kessler, supra note 5.
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